Menu

 

Leon Koj (1929-2006) | Projekt Instytutu Filozofii UMCS

Leon Koj – A Necessary Condition for Mutual Understanding

Tytułowa pozycja udostępniona została przez Google Books. Jest to podgląd ograniczony. Tekst został opublikowany w „Semiotic theory and practice. Proceedings of the Third International Congress of the IASS Palermo, 1984″, Tom 1, (red.) Michael Herzfeld, Lucio Melazzo.

dostęp bezpośredni

Ryszard Kleszcz – Rationality and Requirements of Logic

In this paper I discuss the problem of rationality of beliefs. The standard model of rationality proposes three conditions: 1) proper articulation, 2) respecting the requirements of logic (“logical rationality”), 3) sufficient justification. The second condition is usually understood as two requirements: one concerning consistency, the other suitable deductive abilities. This idea of logical rationality (commonly accepted) is idealised and not used in practice. For this reason the idealized conception should be reformulated. The conception of minimal logical rationality requires the fulfilment of some conditions but it would not presuppose logical omniscience.

Tekst został opublikowany w Logica Trianguli, 4, 2000, 63-71, Dostęp on-line: http://www.filozof.uni.lodz.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/logicatr/Kleszcz_5.pdf

Józef Dębowski – The Principle of Transparency of the Sign and the Problem of Cognitive Mediation and Epistemological Immediatism

The article consists of two parts. In the first part (I) three different formulations of the principle of the transparency of the sign are described. In the first description (E. Husserl) it is said that the sign in a proper sense (both an iconic and conventional one) is transparent for its denotations. In the second description (A. Schaff) only the transparence of its meaning is admitted. As far as the third description is concerned (L. Koj) conviction, that every sign is transparent both for a signed object and its meaning, is typical. In the second part of the article (II) we consider relationship between the principle of the transparency of the sign and traditional distinction between “transparent” and “opaque” cognitive mediator – distinction between medium quo and medium quod. The main conclusion of this article is included in a thesis that linguistic cognition and significative cognition – because it isn’t a direct cognition in the sense of primary directness (perceptive) – isn’t able to guarantee a source of access to a cognized object, so it is not a direct cognition in a proper sense. It means that the transparency of the sign, when it appears in the face of its denotations (E. Husserl’s interpretations) a sign or a system of signs are not able to function as a transparent mediator, i e medium quo. It is like that because – as E. Husserl noticed – the sign (due to its transparency) indeed shows us its denotations, but always through the mediation of its meaning and some significative intention.

[...]

Tekst został opublikowany w Santalka. Philosophy. 2007, T. 15, Nr. 1, Dostęp on-line: http://www.coactivity.vgtu.lt/upload/filosof_zurn/j_debowski_filosofija_nr_1_t15.pdf

Leon Koj – On Defining Meaning Families

In his Philosophical Investigations (Oxford 1958, p. 31-35) Wittgenstein remarked that in natural languages there are expressions which are undefinable. The word „game” was given as an example of undefinable expressions. The meaning of this and similar words is to be grasped only by considering different kinds of games and by hearing the word in different contexts. Wittgenstein says that this word has a sort of meaning consisting of many similar meanings constituting a family of meanings. The remarks of Wittgenstein suggest that the multitude of meanings is the cause of the impossibility of defining terms having families of meaning as their meaning.

[...]

Tekst został opublikowany w „Studia Logica” 1969, vol. XXV. Pobierz pełny tekst: On Defining Meaning Families (format *pdf).

Leon Koj – Zasada przezroczystości a antynomie semantyczne

Zadaniem artykułu jest zbadanie antynomii semantycznych i występujących w nich nazw wyrażeń w świetle tzw. zasady przezroczystości. Według tej zasady w czasie posługiwania się słowami jako znakami dowolnych przedmiotów nasza uwaga skierowana jest na owe przedmioty, a nie na użyte słowa.

Zasada przezroczystości odgrywa naczelną rolę w dyskusjach na temat znaku. Zagadnienie antynomii semantycznych jest najważniejszym problemem semantyki. Ustalenie związku między tymi dwoma tematami powinno być interesujące. Dotychczas nie rozważano systematycznie omawianego związku. Zajęcie się tym tematem jest więc w pełni uzasadnione.

[...]

Tekst został opublikowany w „Studia Logica” 1963, vol. XIV. Pobierz pełny tekst: Leon Koj – Zasada przezroczystości a antynomie semantyczne (format *pdf).